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THE EFFECTS OF COLLUSION AND LIMITED LIABILITY
ON THE DESIGN OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
AGREEMENTS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Amitrajeet A. Batabyal

ABSTRACT

In the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, developing countries (DCs) were adamant that in order to
protect the environment for the future, new institutions were needed which would channel resources
from the wealthy developed countries to the poor DCs. With this backdrop, I analyze the problem
faced by an imperfectly informed supra-national govermuental authority (SNGA) with limited
financial resources which wishes to design an International Environmental Agreement (lEA). The
I

SNGA cannot contract directly with polluting firms in the various DCs; it must deal with such firms
through their governments. I study this tripartite hierarchical interaction and focus on the properties
of the optimal limited liability lEA, which can be implemented by the SNGA when governments and
firms in the individual DCs collude. I show that obtaining voluntary participation and preventing
ex post breach of contract is costly for the SNGA. Further, because the optimal lEA satisfies budget

balance, the level and pattern of pollution abatement is typically not ideal. My analysis suggests that
lEAs are not inherently doomed due to a basic monitoring and enforcement problem arising from
national sovereignty. However, the success of lEAs is fundamentally contingent on the funds
available for environmental protection.
JEL Classification: Q25, H77, D82
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THE EFFECTS OF COLLUSION AND LIMITED LIABILITY
ON THE DESIGN OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
AGREEMENTS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES}

1. Introduction

With the passage of time, it has increasingly been recognized that environmental protection
is an international issue. As noted by Bernauer (1995, p. 354), the scope and significance of this
issue have been amply demonstrated by the events of the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio. At this
Summit, it became clear that if the developed countries of the world wanted " ... the environment
to be secured for future generations, [then they would] have to radically assist the South in choosing
a different road to development than the one they [had] currently [been] traveling on" (Rogers 1993,
p. 27). Indeed, to combat the twin evils of poverty and environmental degradation, developing
/

countries (Des) have demanded the transfer of resources and technology from developed countries.
In such a contentious setting, the success or failure to protect the environment will depend crucially
on the ability of international institutions to craft effective international environmental agreements
(IEAs).2 Given this, a key question becomes "How can international institutions, which necessarily
respect the principle of state sovereignty, contribute to the solution of difficult global problems?"
(Keohane, Haas, and Levy 1993, p. 6). This is the central question that I propose to analyze in this
paper.

II acknowledge financial support from the Utah Agricultural Experiment Station, Utah State University, Logan,
UT 84322-4810, by way of project UTA 024. This paper has benefitted from the comments of seminar participants at
the College of William and Mary and at the University of California, Berkeley. The usual disclaimer applies.
2In this paper I shall use the terms lEA and contract interchangeably.
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On the academic front, researchers have begun to study Issues relating to global
environmental protection in a systematic manner only very recently.3 As a result, many specific
questions remain unanswered. What kinds ofpollution abatement patterns can one expect to observe
in economic environments in which an imperfectly informed supranational governmental authority
(SNGA) contracts with governments and polluting firms in individual DCs? What kinds of
monetary transfers will be needed to get sovereign nations to voluntarily participate in an lEA?
What can the SNGA do to prevent sovereign nations from breaching contracts they had agreed to
ex ante?4 How does the SNGA's inability to monitor pollution abatement in the individual countries

affect the contract design question? Finally, how does the limited availability of funds affect the
SNGA's lEA design question? These are the specific questions that I shall answer in this paper.
Although my analysis is, in principle, applicable to any country, the hierarchical interaction
I

that I shall analyze is particularly relevant to DCs; consequently, the reader should note that it is
these countries that I have in mind in all of the subsequent analysis. 5 I now discuss the nascent
literature on lEAs and then move on to discuss my model in detail.

3See Bernauer (1995), and Keohane, Haas, and Levy (1993) for a more detailed corroboration of this claim.
4By ex ante I mean contracting which takes place with all parties holding symmetric but imperfect information
about the quality of the pollution abatement technology offrrms. By ex post I mean contracting which takes place with
the players holding asymmetric information about the quality of the pollution abatement technology ofthe same frrms.
5The countries I have in mind are those that would be eligible to receive monetary transfers under the Global
Environmental Facility' s (GEF) standard of per capita income of $4,000 or less. For more details, see Rogers (1993 ,
p. 155).
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2. International Environmental Agreements:
A Brief Synopsis

Barrett (1992; 1994) has modeled lEAs as games between different countries. While
Barrett' s analyses are not in the design framework, Barrett makes the important point that for lEAs
to work, they must be self-enforcing. However, the thrust of this point is weakened by Barrett's
focus on identical countries, with no uncertainty. As a result, this line of research is unable to
address fundamental questions arising from imperfectly held information and the heterogeneity of
the contracting countries.
Hoe1 (1991; 1992) addresses the implications of, in turn, unilateral emissions reduction by
countries, and uniform emissions reduction by all countries. Hoel (1991, p. 69) shows that unilateral
actions" ... may ... reduce global welfare ... " by increasing the total emissions of pollutants. Hoel
(1992) argues against the institution of uniform emissions reduction policies in international
agreements, showing that other policies yield higher levels of global welfare.
Shogren, Baik, and Crocker (1992, SBC), Black, Levi, and de Meza (1993, BLD), and
Sandler and Sargent (1995, SS) have all addressed the question of the minimal number of countries
needed to sustain an lEA. In a multiplayer strategic setting, SBC show that countries will sometimes
join lEAs because the expected gains from such an action outweigh the gains from not joining.
However, beyond a critical threshold value, some countries will prefer to free ride and not join the
lEA, whereas the lEA members will want nonparticipants to join. BLD have explored this notion
of a threshold value, which they call "the optimal ratification level." BLD show that this level is
reasonably robust to variations in contractual circumstances; more significantly, BLD argue that the
prospects for effecting an lEA are not necessarily diminished by there being a large number of

/

4
countries.

SS (1995, p. 152) show that the attainment of international coordination by a

"minimal-sized group" is fundamentally dependent on " ... how individual pollution activities add
to the total pollutants experienced ... [by nations]." While these papers have certainly advanced our
understanding of some aspects of" ... the multi-faceted design ... problem," (BLD, p. 281), many
other important questions-which I discussed in section I-remain unanswered. Consequently, I
now discuss my modeling approach to the IEA design question.
Recall that my principal objective is to study the efficacy of international institutions in
solving global environmental problems. To this end, I shall model the international environment as
a multiforked, three-tiered hierarchy. Occupying the topmost tier of the hierarchy is the relevant
international institution or SNGA. This SNGA could be an organization like the World Bank, 6 or
the Commission on Sustainable Development created in Agenda 21 at the Rio Earth Summit. The
./

second and third tiers of the hierarchy consist of the government and a representative polluting firm
in each DC. Each fork of the hierarchy corresponds to a single DC, and there are N such countries. 7
Three-tiered hierarchies have been studied by Tirole (1986; 1988), by Kofman and Lawarree
(1993), and by Batabyal (1996a; 1996b). These researchers have studied the contractual effects of
collusion between the various players in their three-tiered hierarchies. However, to the best of my
knowledge, the problem of designing budget balanced, limited liability contracts in a hierarchical
international setting has not been studied to date.

6Specifically in its role as an administrator of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF).
7The reader will note that in this modeling scheme, I have conferred on the SNGA, the role of principal.
Consequently, there is a distinct asymmetry in the assumed power of the SNGA as opposed to that of governments and
firms . Given that I am interested in DCs, which typically have limited bargaining power in their dealings with
international organizations owing to the fact that their monetary contributions to the budgets of such organizations are
minimal, this hierarchical modeling scheme appears to be appropriate. For more on the power of SNGAs over DCs,
see Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye (1991).
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As such, I shall build on and apply the theory ofhierarchies to study ex ante, limited liability
contracting between the SNGA, national governments, and polluting firms in the various DCs. By
limited liability I mean contracts that impose limits on the maximum ex post loss that governments
and firms in the individual DCs can be forced to bear as a result of pollution abatement in adverse
states of nature. This feature of the lEA that I shall study would appear to be relevant because
international institutions generally cannot guarantee that there will be no ex post breach of contract
by nations. The rationale for the actual contracting stems from issues including, but not limited to,
the harmful atmospheric effects of sulphur and/or nitrogen emissions. The incidence of pollution
may be domestic or transboundary.8 The key element of uncertainty stems from the SNGA's lack
of knowledge about the quality of the pollution abatement technology available in each country.
Whereas the firm in the DC always knows the quality of its technology and the government does in
./

some states of nature, the SNGA is never privy to this information. The random variable denoting
the private information about pollution abatement technology quality is uncorrelated across
countries. This rules out the possibility of the SNGA engaging in relative performance evaluation.
Because most DCs are very heterogeneous, and because it is unlikely that a SNGA would want to
design contracts involving relative performance evaluation, this assumption of uncorrelatedness
appears not to be restrictive. 9 In other words, my analysis holds for any finite set of countries, with
the SNGAIgovernment/firm interaction in one country being independent of the SNGA's dealings
with some other country. Consequently, without loss of generality, I shall focus on an arbitrary
country, say country j, in the finite set of countries. The SNGA's task is to design a limited liability

8See Crane (1993) and Paarlberg (1993) for a discussion of the relevance of international institutions when the
incidence of an environmental externality is domestic.
9Batabyal (1996c) has analyzed contracting with relative performance evaluation.
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lEA which is incentive compatible, collusion-proof, and which will lead to optimal pollution
abatement in country j.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 3, I describe the model in detail and
I study the properties of the first best optimum. In section 4, I study the above-described three-tiered
hierarchy in which governments and firms within a DC may collude to the detriment of the SNGA.

In particular, I analyze an ex ante, limited liability contract, which can be implemented by the SNGA
in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Finally in section 5, I summarize the salient findings of this paper.
The reasons for wanting to study collusion between the polluting firm and the DC
government are threefold. First, while the DC government participates in the lEA because it
recognizes the value of such international participation, this government also acts as the polluting
firm's advocate. This aspect of the problem will give rise to scenarios in which government/firm
J

collusion becomes a desirable option. Io Second, the government and the firm receive monetary
transfers from the SNGA for their roles in abating pollution. I I Further, both these players know that
the SNGA cannot monitor their activities owing to sovereignty. Consequently, there will be
circumstances in which there are incentives for the government and the firm in each country to
collude to maximize the transfers received from the SNGA. Third, as Mookherjee and Png (1995)
noted, corruption is an endemic part of public life in many DCs. This suggests a need for explicitly
modeling the activities of potentially corruptible players. Due to these three reasons, an important
part of this paper will consist of analyzing a collusion-proof lEA.

!OSee Peterson (1993) for a discussion of some practical instances of possible government/fIrm collusion in an
international setting.
" The exact nature of these roles is described in section 3a.
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3. The Theoretical Framework

3a. Description of the Model
Subscript i = 1,2,3,4 will refer to the state of nature, and superscript j

=

1, ... , N will refer

to the country. Let 8 denote the uncertainty about the quality of the abatement technology that is
currently available; 8 has binary support [8 L , 8H ], where 0 < 8L < 8H , and.d8

==

8H

-

8L . I shall

refer to 8L as the low abatement quality parameter and to 8 H as the high abatement quality parameter.
The risk-averse firm produces clean air, whose output and value are denoted by

x

=

a

+

8, XElR + . The firm chooses pollution abatement aElR ++, and the firm's cost of abatement

is g(a), where g 1(.) > 0, g It·) > 0, and g(O)

=

O. This firm has a differentiable net payoff from

abatement function B[ TI. - g( a I.)] with BB [. ]/BT.E(
0, 00), \IT..
TI.ElR + is the state i monetary
I
I
transfer made by the SNGA to the firm for abating pollution. The firm's reservation payoff is

Br = B [Tr ], and 1',. is the reservation transfer. Br and Tr are common knowledge.
The DC government is risk-averse. It has a strictly concave and differentiable utility function
V( G.),
where G.E
lR + is the state i monetary transfer made by the SNGA to the government for its
I
I

role in participating in the lEA. The government's reservation utility is Vr = V( G r ), where Gr ElR +
is the reservation transfer, and V I(G I.) E (0, 00), \lG I.. By employing a monitoring device, the
government receives a signal s, from the firm regarding its private information and then it sends a
report r to the SNGA, indicating what it observed about the firm's pollution abatement technology
quality parameter. 12 In some states of nature, this monitoring device malfunctions and, hence, in
these states, the government will be unable to provide the SNGA with an useful report. Upon

12Since the main objective of this paper is not to study domestic monitoring, I shall assume that the use of this
monitoring device is costless.
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receiving r, the SNGA offers the government a transfer G l.ElR +. The reader should note that making
reporting a key government function is consistent with the government/SNGA interaction proposed
for one specific SNGA, namely, the Commission on Sustainable Development. As noted by Rogers
(1993, p. 310), a key aspect of this interaction involves the " ... Commission's ... considering
information provided by governments .... "
The SNGA is risk-neutral, and it has a welfare function defined over clean air, which takes
the form U = .L:.( a i
}

+

8/ - G i - T i), j = 1, ... , N, where the index j runs over N, the total number

of countries. The quantity of clean air produced by the firm in country j is xi

= ai +

8/. As stated,

the SNGA's welfare is the difference between total clean air production and the sum of government
and firm transfers. In what follows, when there is no cause for confusion, I shall suppress the
country superscript; the analysis will focus on countryj. The SNGA designs the lEA, which it offers
/

to the government and the firm. The contract can only be conditioned on what the SNGA actually
observes, i.e., the government's report r, and the firm's production of clean air X.13
There are four states of nature, each state occurring with probability p l. > 0, where

.L: \;1 Pi = 1. The SNGA, the government, and the firm sign the lEA holding symmetric but imperfect
information about 8. The firm always observes 8 before choosing its abatement level. The
government, on the other hand, mayor may not observe the firm's private information. This
depends on whether the government's monitoring device functions or malfunctions. In other words,
the government's signal s, mayor may not be informative. I can now characterize the four states:

* State 1:

13

The firm and the government both observe 8L .

1 do not discuss the manner in which the SNGA raises revenue. One possibility would be to conform to the
text of Agenda 21. According to this document, developed countries are supposed to contribute 0.7% of their GNP for
the purpose of environmental protection. For more details, see Rogers (1993, pp. 151-60).
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* State 2: The firm observes 8L and the government observes nothing.

* State 3:

The firm observes 8H and the government observes nothing.

* State 4:

The firm and the government both observe 8H .

In state 1, the firm and the government both observe the low abatement technology quality

parameter. The government's monitoring device works and, hence, yields useful information. In
state 2, the firm observes the low abatement technology quality parameter but the government
observes nothing. In this state, the government's monitoring device malfunctions. In state 3, the
firm observes the high abatement technology quality parameter, and, once again, the government's
monitoring device malfunctions. Finally in state 4, the firm and the government observe the high
abatement technology quality parameter.
The timing of the game between the SNGA, the government, and the firm is as follows.
/

First, the SNGA offers a contract to the government and the firm. Second, the firm observes the
actual realization of8 and the government receives its signal s. Third, the firm chooses a. Fourth,
clean air x is produced by the firm, and the government sends its report r to the SNGA, indicating
what it observed. Fifth, the SNGA compensates the government and the firm with transfers G(x, r)
and T(x, r). In this paper, I shall analyze zero liability contracts. In such contracts, the SNGA must
compensate governments and firms with transfers equal in magnitude to the government reservation
utility and the firm reservation payoff, respectively. Alternately put, in such contracts, governments
and firms have the right to disassociate themselves from their ex ante contractual obligations without
any penalty, once they have acquired their private information. For most practical situations, this
zero liability restriction is without loss of generality. Indeed, my subsequent analysis will remain

10
unaltered qualitatively as long as the magnitudes of the government and firm liabilities-L G andL F ,
respectively-are less than the government reservation utility, and the firm reservation payoff. 14
In the remainder of this paper I shall assume that the SNGA can verify the veracity of the
government's report r. In other words, if the government's signal s is noninformative, then the
corresponding report r reflects this fact, and the SNGA can verify that the true facts are indeed as
they have been reported. In symbols, s = 0 = r = O. On the other hand, to keep the SNGA's
design problem interesting and to allow for the possibility of government/firm collusion, I permit
the government to lie and report that its signal is noninformative when in fact such is not the case. IS
That is, s = e = rE {e, O}. This completes the description of my model. I now consider the
benchmark case in which perfect information is acquired by the SNGA.

3b. The First-Best Optimum
In this case, the SNGA observes

/

e and the firm's pollution abatement choice.

When this

happens, the SNGA bypasses the government and contracts with the firm directly. The government
receives its reservation transfer, G,., and, hence, its reservation utility, V;., in all states. The SNGA
solves
max .~ {a! + EY: - gi(a!) - Ti - Gi}
at bj I
I
I
r
r'

(A)

14In a two-tiered hierarchy, Sappington (1983, pp. 15 -7) discusses how zero liability contracts would be altered
by restrictions in which a player's liability exceeds his reservation utility.
lSThe reader will note that I have restricted the government's message space in certain states. Specifically, the
government can lie only in states 1 and 4. The government can also announce the wrong state, but in my setup, this is
equivalent to obtaining a noninformative signal. While in principle this restriction can be relaxed by allowing for an
expanded range of governmental reporting options, from a practical standpoint, such an action would make it
exceedingly difficult to obtain concrete results. This is because relaxing the above restriction would lead to an increased
number of states and, hence, to more constraints on the SNGA's overall optimization problem.
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subject

M~

to

~ ~ pB[T.

(AI)

I

VI

I

- g(a I.)]

~

B,
r

(A2)

B[T.I - g(a I.)]

~

L F , Vi,

and

(A3)

~ {Ti + gi(a!) + Gi}. Because I am analyzing a zero liability contract, B = L F , and,
'Ilj

r

r

I

r

hence, the firm's ex ante participation constraint (AI) can be ignored. Now using the fact that the
zero

liability

dg i ( a )/da!
*

=

constraints

in

(A2)

bind,

the

first-order

necessary

conditions

are

lI( 1 + y), Vi, j, where y is the multiplier on the budget balance constraint (A3)

I

and a is the first-best level of pollution abatement. We see that in the first-best optimum, the
*

marginal cost of pollution abatement in country j is set equal to the reciprocal of one plus the
marginal welfare of the SNGA's funds. The optimal level of abatement a * is independent of the
state; consequently, the firm's transfer for abating pollution is also independent of the state. This
transfer equals T

r

+

g , where Tr is the reservation transfer and g
*

*

==

g( a ).
*

It is not possible to determine whether the SNGA's budget constraint binds in equilibrium.
/

To see why not, note the following. The SNGA's welfare function exhibits constant marginal
welfare in the authority's own funds. As opposed to this, the funds spent making transfers do not
exhibit constant marginal welfare. As a result, it is possible that, in equilibrium, the SNGA will
disburse only a part of

M because the effect of such disbursement on clean air production drops

below one before the SNGA exhausts

M.

The second case in which the SNGA exhausts

M before

the effect on clean air production drops below one is also possible. Which case will prevail depends
on the curvatures of the Bi[.], and particularly the gi(.) functions. In the rest of this paper I shall
assume that the curvatures of these two functions are such that the budget constraints bind in
equilibrium. From a practical standpoint, this is the relevant case. I now discuss the more
interesting case in which the DC government and the firm may collude, and the SNGA cannot
observe

e or the actual abatement undertaken by the firm.
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4. The Effects of Collusion and Limited Liability

Recall that because countries are sovereign, the SNGA is unable to either monitor the actions
of the government and the firm or enforce the terms of the lEA in the event of a contractual breach.
Since the SNGA can never acquire the firm ' s private information and must rely on the government's
report to design the optimal contract, an efficient zero liability contract must not only be individually
rational and incentive compatible, but it must be collusion-proof as well. 16
I shall model collusion between the government and the firm as follows. Before the
resolution of the uncertainty regarding abatement technology quality and at the time of signing the
main contract, i.e., the SNGAIgovernment/firm contract, the firm and the government sign a
secondary contract, which entails the offer and acceptance of a bribe from the firm to its government.
Naturally, this secondary contract is unobservable by the SNGA. The bribe b(·, .), is a function
of what the firm and the government both observe, i.e., the government's report r, and clean air x.
With the offer and acceptance of this bribe, the firm's total transfer becomes {T(·) - b (r, x)} and
the government's total transfer becomes {G ( .) + b (r , x) }. I shall not be concerned with the
question of how the surplus from the bribe is divided. For my purpose, it is only necessary to
stipulate that the bribe is actually paid by the firm to its government. To see why the firm might
want to bribe its government in my four-state world, consider state 4. In state 4, the government is
indifferent between reporting that it has observed 8H and reporting that it has observed O. However,
the firm would prefer that the government report O. This is one instance in which a clear rationale
exists for the firm to bribe its government. 17

16Also see footnote 10.
Also see the discussion in the last paragraph of section 2.

17

/

13
In order to formulate and solve the SNGA's problem when there is collusion, I shall follow

Tirole's method involves imposing constraints in addition to the usual

Tirole (1986; 1988).

participation and incentive compatibility constraints. These additional constraints are designed to
preclude government/firm collusion and, hence, make the main contract collusion-proof.
Denote the collusion-proof transfers to the government and the firm by G and T, respectively.
The SNGA solves
-

max{G f
j'

subject to (A1)-(A2) with
-

V(G) ~ L G , Vi, (B3)
-

Gj +

-

Tj

-

--

g(a j

)

~

T3 -

I:

j'

T2 -

-

T3 -

g(a3 ) ~ G2 +

(B9)

M~

~ f-hVJ {

T2 -

-

and Gi replaced with T.I and G I., (B1)

g(a3 ) ~

-

g(a2

T2 -

-

g(a2 ),

(B6)

--

G3 +

(B)

j

--

G2 +

-

} ~ f7Z p I.( a.I + 8.I - G.I - T I.)
a

Ll8), (B4)
-

-

G 4 + T4

-

~ ~ p . V(G . ) ~
VI

I

- g(a ) ~ T3 -

T2 -

g(a4 )

--

G3 + T3

V,
(B2)
r

g(a3 + Ll8), (B5)

2

~

I

-

g(a3 ),

(B7)

- - - -

g(a2

-

Ll8),

(B8)

G2 + T2

-

g(a2 ) ~ G3 +

T3 -

g(a3 + Ll8), and

a! + T!}, Vi.
I

I

The constraint (B 1) is the government's ex ante participation constraint. The four constraints
in (B2) denote the government's zero liability constraints. These constraints can be interpreted as
the maximum penalty that can be imposed on the government by the SNGA in the event that ex post,
the government chooses to disassociate itself from its contractual obligations. Because I am
studying zero liability contracts, Vr = LG and Br = LF . Constraints (B3) and (B4) are the firm's
incentive compatibility constraints. Constraint (B3) says that in state 3, the firm should not claim
that the state is actually 2. Similarly, (B4) tells us that in state 2, the firm should not claim that the
state is actually 3. Note that these are also the states in which the government's signal s is
noninformative. Constraints (B5) and (B6) are the core collusion constraints. Recall that in states
1 and 4 the government's signal s is informative. In these two states, the government can hide this

/
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fact. Given this, constraints (BS) and (B6) tell us that should the firm bribe its government, then the
total sum of the transfers less the cost of pollution abatement in states 1 and 4 cannot be less than
the corresponding totals in states 2 and 3, respectively. Constraint (B7) tells us that the government
should not be able to bribe the firm in state 3 to abate at the level that is appropriate for state 2.
Similarly, (B8) says that the government should not be able to bribe the firm to claim that the state
is 3 when it is 2. Finally, (B9) denotes the SNGA's budget constraints. These constraints tell us that
irrespective of state, the total sum of transfers paid to the government and the firm in the various
countries cannot exceed the SNGA's available budget M for environmental protection. Solving the
SNGA's problem (B) subject to (A1)-(A2) and (B1)-(B9), I get

Theorem 1: The optimal zero liability contract when there is government/firm collusion is one in
which
~

I.

(i)
I.

~

I.

~

I.

~

A jg (a j) = A 3g (a 3) = A $ (a 4) > A p (a 2) ,
-

-

-

T3 - g(a3) > T4 - g(a4) > T j - g(a j )

-

( iii )

-

-

/

-

G4 > G j = G2 = G3 = Gr ,

(

i v )

-

=

T2 - g(a2), and (v) at the optimum all the constraints except

(AI), (A2, i = 1.2.3), (B 1), (B2, i = 4), (B4) and (B8) bind. I8

Proof· See the Appendix.
In order to intuitively verify that the above contract is collusion-proof, I have to show that
constraints (AI )-(A2) and constraints (B 1)-(B9) are satisfied. By part (v) of Theorem 1, constraints
(A2, i = 1,2), (B2, i = 1,2,3), (B3), (BS), (B6), (B7) and (B9) are satisfied. The proof of Theorem 1
tells us that constraints (AI), (A2, i = 3,4), (B1), (B2, i=4), (B4) and (B8) hold as strict inequalities.
Thus the equilibrium contract is indeed collusion-proof. Let us now study this collusion-proof
contract in greater detail.

18For an exact representation of AI and D, see the proof of Theorem 1 in the Appendix.
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First, part (i) of Theorem 1 tells us that the actual level of pollution abatement in any state
is a function of the state probability p.,1 and the multiplier on the budget constraint y 1.. Part (ii) tells
us that the optimal contract equalizes the weighted marginal cost of pollution abatement in states 1,
3, and 4.
weights. 19 Because the budget constraints bind in equilibrium, the contractually specified levels of
abatement will generally not be ideal. In this connection, the reader should note that because the
expression for the first-best level of abatement a in section 3b involves a multiplier y that is
*

specific to the first-best problem, no direct comparison of the optimal abatement levels across the
two modeling scenarios can be made.
Second, part (iii) of Theorem 1 tells us that the transfers to the DC government reflect the
usefulness of the government's report to the SNGA. In particular, because the government's report
/

-

-

is noninformative to the SNGA in states 2 and 3, G2 = G3 = Gr holds. Further, in order to prevent
collusion and to encourage the government to tell the truth in the high abatement technology quality
-

-

-

-

state 4, the SNGA offers G4 > G2 = G3 = G] = Gr' The government earns no informational rents
in the low abatement technology quality state 1 because the SNGA is successful in inducing the
government to reveal its private information truthfully at least cost.
Third, parts (iv) and (v) of Theorem 1 tell us that at the optimum, the firm and the
government liability constraints bind more often than not. This means that the optimal contract
offered by the SNGA must respect the fact that ex post, the firm and the government may choose to
disassociate themselves from their contractual obligations in several states of nature. To see why
these liability constraints do not bind in every state of nature, consider the firm liability constraints

19See step 13 of the proof of Theorem 1 for an exact representation of these weights.
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for states 3 and 4. The state 3 liability constraint is slack because the incentive compatibility
constraint for this state binds at the optimum. This simply reflects the fact that in this high
abatement technology quality state, the incentive compatibility constraint (B3) is always more
restrictive than the liability constraint. Similarly in state 4, as compared to the liability constraint,
the collusion incentive compatibility constraint (B6) is more pressing to the SNGA. In particular,
in order to ensure that no collusion takes place in this high abatement technology quality state, the
SNGA has to pay a premium to the firm. This is why the state 4 firm liability constraint is slack at
the optimum.
Note that as compared to the case in which the government and the firm do not collude, the
SNGA is clearly worse off in this collusion case. This is because the possibility of government/firm
collusion necessitates the inclusion of constraints (BS)-(B8). In other words, the number ofbinding
/

constraints in the collusion case exceeds the number ofbinding constraints in the no collusion case.
However, if the SNGA does indeed offer the contract with the characteristics described in
Theorem 1, then its monetary obligations will be as described in the Theorem. The reader should
note that the SNGA offers the best contract possible from the set of feasible, zero liability contracts
that are constrained to be budget balancing and collusion-proof.

5. Conclusions
In this paper I analyzed the question of environmental protection for developing countries
within the framework of the directives set forth in the various agreements reached at the 1992 Rio
Earth Summit. I modeled the institutional setting for the underlying problem as a three-tiered
hierarchy with N forks, and then I studied the effects of collusion and limited liability on the
SNGA's lEA design problem. Four significant policy conclusions emerge.
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First, the liability constraints for the government and the finn generally bind at the optimum.
This means that from the perspective of the SNGA, it is costly to obtain voluntary participation by
individual DCs and preventing ex post breach of contract. This notwithstanding, Barrett (1994) has
argued that for lEAs to work, they must be self-enforcing. Along the same lines, Rogers (1993,
p. 236) has worried that many of the Earth Summit directives " ... offer a back door option by which
signatories can excuse themselves at a later date if the going gets too tough." The implementability
of limited liability contracts of the sort analyzed in this paper should allay such concerns because
a limited liability contract is self-enforcing. Put differently, as compared to an ex ante contract, a
limited liability contract is more likely to be renegotiation-proof.
Second, money matters. Although one cannot be certain that budgetary considerations will
have a qualitative impact on the contractually specified pollution abatement levels, it seems
/

reasonable to suppose that in any practical setting, such considerations will influence actual pollution
abatement patterns by limiting the magnitude of the transfers that a SNGA can make.
Third, the SNGA will prefer ex ante contracting to contracting with limited liability
constraints. Because ex ante contracting involves optimization with fewer constraints, the SNGA's
expected welfare with ex ante contracting will be higher than its expected welfare with limited
liability contracting. However, in the context ofDCs, unless a SNGA can limit the ex post liability
of the players, nations are unlikely to participate in ex ante contracting schemes. Further, ex ante
contracting schemes will generally not be self-enforcing.
Fourth, the SNGA can indeed circumvent the monitoring and enforcement problem stemming
from national sovereignty by designing collusion-proof contracts. This tells us that the concerns of
researchers like Krasner (1983) who have worried about the deleterious effects of sovereignty, are

18
somewhat misplaced.

At least in the realm of international environmental affairs, the main

impediments to the design of efficient lEA's appear to involve funds and informational
imperfections.
With talk of rising disparity between the South and the North and the increasingly
acrimonious nature of international discussions regarding the use of environmental resources, the
lEA design question studied in this paper takes on particular significance. This is in no small
measure due to the fact that the implementation of such agreements will do more to engender and
maintain international security than will most strategic or unilateral policy measures.

/
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Appendix

Proof of Theorem 1: Because Br

LF and Vr

=

=

Lo' (AI) and (B1) are redundant and can be

ignored. Omitting (B4) and (B8) temporarily, the Lagrangian is
~

-

-

= ~ 1. P 1.( x.1 - G1. - T1.)

+ ~ .ct. { B [ .]

-

-

1

p,

-

y 1., i

=

1

V( .) - La}
-

T2

+

g( • )}

T3 - g( .) - 02 - T2

E , K,
1

1

-

T1 - g( .) - G2

K {03 +

D.,

1

-

E 1{ G1 +

where ct.,
1

1

+ ~.D . {

- LF }

1,2,3,4, I

=

-

+ E 2 { G4 +

g( • )}

+

+

-

-

{T3 - g ( .) - T2

+ P

+

g ( • )}

+

--

T4 - g( .) - G3 - T3

~.y
.[Ai - ~. { O!1
I I }

+

g( • )}

+

+

T!}
],
1

(b)

1,2 are the multipliers associated with (A2), (B2),

(B3), (BS), (B6), (B7), and (B9), respectively. The first-order necessary conditions are (b 1)

°

1)

= P1

D4Vt 04)

=P4 -

D1 V I(

Yl' (b2) D2 V

- E1 +

E2 +

t

2)

= P2

+ E1 + K +

Y4' (b5)a l {aB [. ]/aTI } =PI -

(b 7)

°

ct 3 { aB [ • ]/aT3 }

=P3 + E2 -

{ alB

t·] + EI }g I( a l ) =PI'

{ ct 3B

t · ] + P - E2 + K }g I( a3 ) =P3'

P- K + Y3'

(b 1 0)

{ a 2B t·]

EI +

Y2' (b3) D3 V

t

°

3)

= P3

+ E2 - K +

YI' (b6) ct 2 {aB [. ]/aT2 } =P2 + P

Y3' (b4)

+ E1 + K +

Y2'
.I

-

(

b 8)

ct 4 { aB [ • ]/aT4 }

=P4 -

E2 +

Y4'

- EI } g I( a2 ) =P2 + {P + K}g I( a2 - il8),

(

b 9)

(b 11)

and (b 12) { ct 4B t · ] + E2 } g I( a4) =P4 .

Step 1: The budget constraints bind at the optimum.
Proof' This result follows by assumption. Also see the related discussion in section 3b . •

Step 2: The state 2 firm and government liability constraints bind at the optimum.
Proof' Suppose ct2 =0. Then (b6) tells us that Y2 = -(P2 +P +E I +K), which is impossible irrespective

which is impossible irrespective of whether

EI ~

0 and

K ~

O. Thus,

D2

> O. •

Step 3: The state 1 firm and government liability constraints bind at the optimum.
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Proof' (bI) tells us that

VI

= EI = 0 is impossible. (bI) and (bS) tell us that either (i)

or (ii) (X I > 0 and VI > O. If (I) holds, then (BS) is slack and
and

VI

EI

(Xl

= VI = 0

= O. But this is impossible. Thus (X I > 0

>0 . •

Step 4: The state 3 government liability constraint binds at the optimum.
Proof' V3 = 0

only if (X3

=

==?

K

=P3

P = O.

+ E2 + Y3'

Substituting this into (b7) I get (X3 B

t .] = -p.

This equality holds

Clearly, the state 3 participation constraint and the incentive compatibility

constraint cannot both be slack at the optimum. Thus V3 > O. •
Step 5: (B3) binds at the optimum.
Proof' Suppose

p = O.

Then (b3) and (b7) give (X3 > O. Using this in (B3) yields g(a2-L18»g(a2).

This is impossible. Thus

p> O. •

Step 6: The state 3 firm liability constraint is slack at the optimum.
/

Proof' Clearly, (X3 = P = 0 and (X3 > 0,

p> 0 are impossible.

-

T3 -g(a3) =Tr>Tr +g(a2)-g(a2-L18)==?O>g(a2)-g(a2-L18).

Suppose (X3 > 0 and

p = O.

Then

This is impossible because L18 > O. I

p> O. •

conclude that (X3 = 0,

Step 7: The state 4 firm and government liability constraints are slack at the optimum.
Proof' (b4) and (b8) tell us that either (i) (X4> 0 and V4> 0 or (ii) a 4 = V4 = O. If (i) holds, then

(B6) is violated. Thus a 4 = V 4 = O. •
-

-

-

-

Step 8: G4 > G I = G2 = G3 = Gr'
Proof' This follows because VI > 0, V2 > 0, V3 > 0, and V4 = O. •
Step 9: (BS) and (B6) bind at the optimum.
Proof' a l > 0, C(.2> 0, V3 > 0, v 4 > 0 tell us that
-

-

-

-

EI

> O. (b4) and v 4 = 0 tell us that

Step 10: T3 - g(a3»T4 - g(a4» TI - g(a I ) = T2 - g(a 2)·

E

2

> O. •
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Proof' This follows because cx 4

=

0, cx 3

=

0, u 3 > 0, u 4

=

0,

E

2

> O. •

Step 11: (B 7) binds at the optimum.
Proof' (B7) binds, i.e., K> 0, .,'

Step 12:

P> 0

-

For i*2, ai=(g /rl{p!(Pi+Yi)}'

D = {p / (P2 + Y2) - g I( a2 ) }

-

and G2 = G3 • •

l

and "a2 =(g/r [{p/(P2+ y )}-D], where

.

From (b5) and (b9) I get a l = (g Ir 1 {p /(P 1 + Y1) } .

Proof'

From (b6) and (b 10) I get

a2 = (g I) -l[ {P/(P2 + Y2)} - D]. From (b7) and (bll) I get a3 = (g ) -1{P/(P3 + Y3)}' Finally, from
(b8) and (bI2) I get a4 = (g /r l {p/(P4 +y 4 )} • •

- I(a ) =A- g I(a ) =A- g I(a ) > A- g I(a ), where Ai
Step 13: Alg
l
4
4
3
3
2
2

=

(Pi +Y)/Pi' 1. = 1, ... ,4.

Proof' From the proof to Step 12, it followsthatA2g l(a 2) < 1 =A1gI(a l ) =A3 gl(a 3) =A4g l(a 4) . •
I

now

check

to

see

that

(B4)

and

(B8)

are

Suppose

satisfied.

that
./

g I > 0 and gil> 0, this last equality holds iff a2 > a3 • However, a contract which requires that
relative to state 3, there be more abatement in the low abatement technology quality state 2, cannot
be optimal. Hence T2 - g( a2) > T3 - g( a3 +.d8). Intuitively, we know that for i

=

2,3, either the

incentive compatibility constraint binds or the participation constraint binds, but not both. For state
3, the high abatement technology quality state, the incentive compatibility constraint binds; hence,
the participation constraint is slack. As contrasted to this, in the low abatement technology quality
state 2, the participation constraint binds; hence, the incentive compatibility constraint is slack.
-

Having shown that (B4) is satisfied, to verify that (B8) is satisfied, it suffices to note that G2
This completes the proof of Theorem 1. • •

-

=

G3 •

